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A LEARNING-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We apply insights from Edith Penrose’s work to extant theory of the multinational 
enterprise (MNE) as enveloped by John Dunning’s Ownership, Location, 
Internalization (OLI) Paradigm. We suggest that Penrose’s knowledge-based 
approach has important implications on the nature of, and the interactions between, O, 
L and I. Importantly, the resource/knowledge-based perspective of Penrose helps 
endogenize and integrate the three elements of Dunning’s triad in the context of a 
dynamic, strategic and forward-looking knowledge-based perspective of the MNE. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to follow-up and apply insights from Edith Penrose’s 
work to extant theory of the MNE, as enveloped, in particular, by John Dunning’s 
(1977, 1988, 2000, 2003) Ownership, Location, Internalization (OLI) perspective. 
We claim that Penrose’s insights have implications on the nature of O, L and I, and 
the interactions between the three. They serve as a means of endogenizing and 
integrating all three elements in the context of a dynamic strategic and forward-
looking knowledge-based perspective of the MNE.  
 
In Section II we cover briefly existing contributions to the MNE, focusing on the OLI 
as their envelope. Section III discusses Penrosean insights of relevance to extant 
theory, and proposes a knowledge/resource-based interpretation of OLI. Section IV 
contains concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
 
II. THEORY OF THE MNE AND THE OLI 
 
The theory of the MNE dates back to Stephen Hymer’s PhD dissertation, completed 
in 1960, and published in 1976. The reason Hymer is unquestionably the father-figure 
of the theory of the MNE is that he is the first scholar who posed the question why 
foreign direct investment (FDI), vis-à-vis alternative modalities of  what he called 
‘foreign operations’, like licensing, tacit collusion, joint ventures, etc2. Accordingly, 
Hymer posed the questions ‘why internalize’, for the case of the MNE, much in line 
with Coase’s (1937) similar question for the national firm3. 
Hymer attributed the benefits of FDI to the advantages of the control it conferred to 
firms. He proposed two major reasons for the choice of FDI, as well as a third, less 
important one. ‘Removal of conflict’ between firms in international markets, and the 
exploitation of the monopolistic advantages of firms were the two major reasons. 
‘Risk diversification’ was the third (less important one because it did not confer 
control). Through FDI firms could both reduce the forces of rivalry in international 
markets, and exploit their monopolistic advantages better than through the open 
market . That was possible for numerous ‘market failure’ (or intra-firm success)-
related reasons, to include the avoidance of bilateral oligopoly, difficulties of finding 
licensees in foreign countries, honest or dishonest differences in the perceptions of the 
value of the advantage, etc. All these have predated more recent literatures, as 
documented conclusively in Casson (1990), Horagushi and Toyne (1990), Pitelis 
(2002), and Dunning and Pitelis (2004). 
 
While the Coasean question ‘why internalize’, was already present in 1960, Hymer 
pursued explicitly Coase’s arguments in a 1968 article. He also quoted Coase in 
Hymer 1970 and 19724. Post-Hymer developments of the MNE narrowed down the 
‘why internalize the advantages’ question. Various important contributions 
                                                 
2 Earlier contributions to the literature included both Edith Penrose (1956) and John Dunning (1958), 
indeed Hymer (1976) cites both Dunning and Penrose in his PhD thesis. However, neither Penrose, nor 
Dunning had posed the question why FDI (intra-firm) versus inter-firm foreign operations. 
3 Indeed he even used the verb ‘internalize’ already at the PhD thesis  “The firm is a practical devise 
which substitutes for the market. The firm internalizes or supersedes the market” (Hymer, 1976, p. 48) 
4 His analysis and, even, terminology in this article incorporates most major contributions of the post-
Coase transaction costs literature, see Dunning and Pitelis (2004). 
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emphasized different reasons. Buckley and Casson (1976) focused on the public good 
character of ‘intangible assets’, which are susceptible to ‘market failure’ if they are 
not exploited internally, while Williamson (1981) stressed post-contract hold-ups, in 
the case of ‘opportunistic’ licensees and investments in specific assets. 
 
Post-Hymer ‘internalization’ theorists did not address the issue of location. Dunning 
(1958) had done so, and indeed Hymer discussed locational factors under various 
guises, for example, exploitation of foreign assets, better demand conditions abroad 
etc., see Dunning and Pitelis (2004). Location is most crucial, indeed a sine-qua-non 
or the theory of the MNE (Dunning 1998). One reason is that, in effect, most 
questions on the MNE are also applicable for the case of non-MNEs. Penrose (1987) 
criticized both Hymer-type and Coase-type application to the theory of the MNE, for 
failing to distinguish between intra-country and inter-national expansion. For inter-
country expansion the crucial issue of course, is the investment in different countries. 
This is a locational issue. In addition, it is an issue that involves location under 
different regulatory jurisdictions. In this context, the whole debate on why MNEs can 
usefully be subdivided to three sub-questions. First, why internationalization. Second, 
why integration/internalization. Third, which location, to include which country. 
 
In Hymer (1976, 1970, 1972) why internationalization (why foreign operations in his 
words), is explained in terms of push and pull factors, such as external market 
opportunity, product life cycle considerations, and differential demand conditions 
(e.g. mature domestic markets), (see Pitelis (2002a). Such considerations, especially 
when viewed in line with other ‘locational’ considerations by Hymer (see Dunning 
and Pitelis 2004) also provide an indirect answer to the question ‘which country’ (in 
contrast to Penrose’s critique). Instead, the ‘internalization school’ did not focus on 
the questions ‘why internationalization’ and ‘which country/location’. It is John 
Dunning’s OLI that envelopes all three aspects. In the OLI, O stand for Ownership 
advantages specific to the firm (which need not be monopolistic, but could also be 
due to efficiency). L stands for Locational advantages, and I for Internalization 
advantages. The main idea is that given O, L will explain the choice of location, and I 
the choice of modality. In terms of our questions, L explains ‘which country’ (and up 
to a point ‘why internationalization’) and I, why internalization. O is a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition for both ‘internationalization’ and ‘internalization’. 
 
OLI has served and is serving an important role in the literature in part because of its 
paradigmatic nature, and in part because of the agility and ability of its proponents to 
incorporate new ideas and developments, as well as to propose new ones, see, for 
example, Dunning (2000, 2005)5. However, it is arguable that in its early 
manifestation in the OLI, has paid limited attention to the endogeneity of advantages,  
in particular the link between intra-firm knowledge generation, O advantages and 
their relation to L, and I advantages - –and thus (up to a point) the OLI underplayed 
the firm as a strategic actor6.Moreover, and similar to the internalization theories, the 
                                                 
5 Dunning (2005), for example, proposes institution-seeking FDI, an idea in line with the knowledge-
based perspective. 
6 In contrast to some critics (e.g., Teece, 2005), Hymer had examined the historical evolution of O 
advantages in the context of his “‘law’ of increasing firm size” (Hymer, 1972), yet failed to see 
advantages as a process of endogenous knowledge generation and (thus) firm growth. That task was 
performed by Penrose (1959) and up to a point by evolutionary models of the MNE, such as Kogut and 
Zander’s (1993). Despite significant progress in dynamising and extending the OLI (e.g., Dunning, 
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quasi-exogeneity of O, L and I also implies that the framework can benefit from a 
more dynamic, knwoeldge-based foundation.7 We contend that Penrose’s contribution 
to the theory of (the growth of) the firm can serve such a purpose. 
 
III. EDITH PENROSE, THE MNE AND THE OLI 
 
Penrose was one of the earlier contributors to the MNE, her 1956 article in the 
Economic Journal, appeared prior to Hymer’s PhD thesis. As discussed by others, eg 
Dunning (2003a), Pitelis (2000, 2004), Kay (1999), Rugman and Verbeke (2002), 
Penrose dealt extensively with MNEs and MNE-country relationships in general (e.g., 
the 1956 article), and in particular in the context of the ‘international oil industry’ and 
Arab countries. In the context of this work, Penrose was one of the earlier contributors 
to issues of ‘transfer pricing’, ‘dumping’, ‘infant-firm’ arguments (in support to some 
protectionism), etc.8 However, she did not address the question ‘why MNEs’ vis-à-
vis, let’s say, licensing or exports, therefore, she did not deal with the ‘nature of the 
MNE’. This is not very surprising - her subsequent 1959 classic book on The Theory 
of the Growth of The Firm (TGF thereafter) did not address the issue why (national) 
firms either9. Rather more surprising is the fact that Penrose did not explore in any 
detail  the implications of her TGF contribution for the MNE10. 
 
 The fundamental insight in TGF was that intra-firm knowledge generation (through 
learning) generates excess resources. These motivate  manages to expand, as ‘excess 
resources’ can be put to (profitable) use, at (near) zero marginal cost. This 
endogenous knowledge/growth dynamic is realized through managerial ‘productive 
opportunity’ –the perceived (dynamic) interaction between internal resources and 
external/market opportunity (Penrose, 1959, Chapter V). 
 
Despite some limitations11, we claim here that Penrose’s insight has implications on 
the OLI, our three related questions, and the need for a more endogenous, dynamic, 
strategic and forward-looking theory of the MNE.  To substantiate this claim, we first 
focus on Dunning’s triad. 
 
 1. O(wnership) 
In TGF O advantages are not monopolistic, at least as far as their process of 
derivation goes. They are efficiency advantages by definition, as they are the result of 
an endogenous knowledge/innovation process. O advantages only become 
monopolistic when firms attempt to capture value by, for example, creating 
                                                                                                                                            
2005), an application of Penrose’s intra-firm knowledge generation dynamic to the OLI has not been 
attempted before. 
7 By quasi-exogenous we refer to the idea that while it is always possible to provide an ex-post 
explanation of advantages in line with one or other view, no detailed explanation of intra-firm 
advantages generation has been provided in extant Hymer, transaction costs and (thus) early OLI-
based theories.  The intra-firm focus is specific to Penrose (and subsequent resource-based-view (RBV) 
scholarship, see, for example, Pitelis, 2006, for a recent account). 
8 As discussed in Pitelis (2002a). 
9 Although she explicitly distinguished between the firm and the market and discussed the boundaries 
issue, she went on to focus on growth, not on the issue of the existence per-se.  
10 For a speculation as to why, see Kay (1999) and Pitelis (2000) 
11 Notably, the observation that the use of managerial time has positive costs (Marris, 1999) that TGF 
fails to deal with issues of intra-firm conflict (Pitelis, 2000) and that a number of important assertations 
by Penrose have yest to be tested (Pitelis, 2006). 
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‘impregnable bases’, raising barriers to entry, using restrictive practices, etc. All these 
are discussed in Penrose (1959, mainly Chapter VII). In addition in Penrose (1968) 
there are also explicit references to both efficiency and monopolistic advantages in the 
context of the multinational oil firms. Monopolistic advantages are in line with 
Penrose’s claim that while the process of expansion is definitionally efficient, the 
resulting state need not be - as/when MNEs try to capture value through monopolistic 
practices. The dual nature of O advantages, as both efficiency and monopolistic, is in 
line with Dunning and provides support to his views. In addition, the Penrosean 
insight serves to provide an intra-firm, efficiency-based explanation of (endogenous) 
O advantages. It also introduces the important distinction between process and state-
type advantages, the latter being potentially monopolistic as originally suggested by 
Hymer.12 
 
 2. L(ocation) 
Penrose did not deal with L in TGF. In her preface to the third edition (Penrose 1995) 
she claimed that all the theory of the MNE requires it to suitably adapt her TGF ideas, 
and account for the existence of different nations. This would require accounting for 
inter-national differences in regulatory and tax systems, different laws and cultures, 
etc. (p. xv). Penrose did not pursue this much further, leaving it to other scholars to do 
so. (We will return to this later, when discussing I.) Nevertheless, the Penrosean 
perspective has important implications on resource/asset/knowledge/innovation 
seeking and augmenting locational advantages for FDI. As firms are bundles or 
resources creating knowledge, it is ‘natural’ for them to locate where existing 
resources/knowledge is such that it can add value to firms’ existing resources, 
knowledge and technological bases and (thus) operations. This implication from 
Penrose’s work is in line with Dunning’s discussion of asset seeking Locational 
advantages (e.g., Dunning 2001), and more recent attempts to build a theory of the 
meta-national (e.g., Doz 2004), which consider MNEs as pursuers of global learning, 
knowledge acquisition and upgrading. 
 
 3. I(nternalization) 
Penrose did not deal with I - advantages in the specific context of the MNE.13 
However, it is not accurate to claim that she did not deal with ‘internalization’ 
altogether. She dealt extensively with integration, which she considered as an earlier 
(and more accurate) term for ‘internalization’.14 Accordingly, her views on 
‘internalization’ should be looked at in her analysis of horizontal and vertical 
integration. In TGF, both are extensive. In both cases, there are detailed arguments. 
For example, one argument she offers for horizontal integration is the acquisition of 
                                                 
12 On the last mentioned Penrose (1959, p. 113) observes that “A firm may attempt to entrench itself by 
destroying or preventing effective competition by means of predatory competitive practices or 
restrictive monopolistic devises that relieve it of the necessity of either meeting or anticipating serious 
competitive threats to its position. In such circumstances a firm may grow for a considerable period 
depending on the demand for its products, harassed neither by price competition nor by the fear that 
competitive developments will make its products or processes obsolete. Examples of growth over long 
periods which can be attributed exclusively to such protection are rare, although elements of such 
protection are to be found in the position of nearly every large firm.” 
13 The nearest she comes in the book to discussing the MNE is the following: “Often the large firms 
organize their various types of business in separate divisions or subsidiaries” (p. 156) 
14 In private discussions. Note also that Richardson (1972) too, pursued this approach. In essence the 
two terms are synonymous. 
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valuable managerial resources (partly in response to the ‘Penrose effect’- limits to 
growth due to limited intra-firm managerial resources).  
“Of special importance is the fact that a firm can also acquire an experienced 
management ‘team’ and an experienced technical and labour force. Hence 
acquisition can be used as a means of obtaining the productive services and 
knowledge that are necessary for a firm to establish itself in a new field, and the 
addition of new managerial and technical services is often far more important 
than the elimination of competition and the reduction of the costs of entry.” 
(Penrose, 1959, pp. 127-128).  
 
Concerning vertical integration, according to Penrose, one reason for it is the superior 
knowledge, and (thus) ability of firms to cater for their own needs, as they have better 
knowledge of these (Pitelis and Wahl, 1998 discuss these points in more detail). For 
example, Penrose states that  
“opportunities arising from the nature of the productive resources of the firm 
giving the firm an advantage in the production of some of its own 
requirements, market opportunities in the case of forward integration, 
competitive pressures of various kinds, special problems arising from the 
existence of uncertainty, all play a similar role.” (1959, pp. 145-146) . 
 
Applying such ideas to the case of the MNEs, would suggest resource/knowledge-
seeking differential capability-induced FDI.15 The last mentioned is in effect Kogut 
and Zander’s (1993) subsequent (independent to Penrose’s) ‘evolutionary’ 
contribution to the MNE (see also Verbeke, 2003, for a critical account)16. 
 
To summarize, TGF arguments on integration have implications on I, in line with 
more recent theoretical developments. Importantly, moreover, the 
knowledge/resource-based approach is that by bringing central stage the role of 
learning, it has important implications both for interaction effects between O, L and I, 
and also on the case for a more forward-looking approach for the MNE (and more 
widely), one that (tries to account for) anticipated change and to act on its basis. 
 
IV. INTERACTION EFFECTS AND THE CASE FOR A FORWARD-
LOOKING PERSPECTIVE 
 
Interaction effects have not been given much attention in the literature.They are 
crucial. O, L and I are dynamically inter-related. For example, L advantages once 
realized serve as O advantages. Similarly, I advantages are O advantages too (viz 
Hymer’s (1972) view that ‘multinationality per se’ is an advantage, the standard view 
that vertically integrated firms may possess higher market power, etc., see Pitelis and 
Sugden (2002) for more on such advantages). In turn, I advantages are related to L 
                                                 
15 Also institution-seeking FDI, a more recent important addition to the OLI (Dunning, 2005). 
16 Being capabilities-based and very Penrosean in nature, this contribution has acquired prominence. 
Yet both the Penrosean view of vertical integration and Kogut and Zander’s view of the MNE, suffer 
from a failure to appreciate that differential firm capabilities are tantamount to relative firm superiority 
on the market (i.e. relative market failure). This also raises the question why - in which context the 
Hymer/Buckley/Casson/Williamson transaction costs-based explanation is of significance. It is 
interesting to note that in her case study on the Hercules Powder Company (Penrose, 1960) she 
provides a reason for vertical non-integration of Hercules’ customers and of Hercules, in terms of 
‘oligopolistic interaction’ arguments, but also in terms of the superior advantages of specialization of 
Hercules’. 
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and O advantages in that the last two pose the question what and where to be 
internalized respectively. In addition, in the context of a learning perspective, L and I 
advantages are endogenously selected as O advantages in the very process of firm 
growth. Crucially moreover O, L and I can be/are shaped by firms’ own decisions. 
Managers ‘productive opportunity’ is in part a result of their own efforts to shape the 
firms’ internal and external environment.17 In this context, ‘productive opportunity’ 
both helps endogenize and shape O, L and I. This helps provide a more endogenous, 
dynamic, and forward looking strategic theory or the MNE. 
 
Another aspect of the Penrosean theory, often missed in the literature, is that it helps 
explain whether, what, when, where and how to integrate/internalize. This is a crucial 
limitation of the transaction costs approach, especially Williamson’s (e.g., 1981) 
version. Despite his advocacy of ‘bounded rationality’, in his story, firms are always 
able to answer ‘make or buy’ through a solution of a global optimization process that 
includes transaction (and production) costs. If anything, solving this problem can be 
more difficult than the standard neoclassical problem of (production) cost 
minimization-profit maximization. Penrose’s endogenous (perceived and imperfect) 
intra-firm knowledge generation idea provides an answer to the question whether to 
‘make or buy’ (but also what, when, where and how). These questions are beyond the 
scope of both transaction costs economies and early versions of the OLI, as they 
involve learning. They are of importance. Clearly, Penrose’s insight needs to be 
developed, and clearly managers will often make the wrong decisions, s learning 
through trial and error. 
 
By relying on learning the emergent resource/knowledge-based OLI is more 
concurrent/synchronic and also forward looking than its earlier cousins. It implies that 
proactive growing firms must at any given point in time rely on their endogenously 
generated extant ‘productive opportunity’ to make imperfect L and I decisions not 
just on the basis of what reality is perceived to be now, but also on the basis of 
anticipated change. This may require making apparently ‘sub-optimal’ decisions now, 
which are expected to turn out to be superior in the medium or longer terms, if and 
when conditions have changed in the way managers have expected, hoped for and 
importantly, aimed for! Such decisions moreover often need to be made 
simultaneously. A firm contemplating expansion, may have the option of horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate expansion, domestically or cross-border. Its decision is based 
on existing knowledge, resources and advantages and its implementation represents 
simultaneously a locational, internalization and ownership-related advantage (or dis-
advantage as the case may be). 
 
While at any point in time, the O, L and I in the knowledge-based perspective look 
very much like the modern version of the OLI (e.g., Dunning 2001, 2005), the 
Penrose-based knowledge-based OLI is by its very nature more concurrent and 
forward looking. By helping explain O, L and I endogenously, paying more attention 
to firms efforts to shape O, L, and I, and by recognizing the close links and 
interactions between the three the knowledge-based OLI also needs to account for 
anticipated and aimed for change. It is therefore both more agency-based and forward 
                                                 
17 “Firms not only alter the environmental conditions necessary for the success of their actions, even 
more important, they know that they can alter them and that the environment is not independent of their 
own activities” (Penrose, 1959, p. 42) 
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looking. On the other hand, it is clearly messier to implement, involving a higher 
degree of possible error. 
 
Despite such limitations, a knowledge-based OLI is more in line with concepts such 
as ‘born-global’ firms and meta-nationals. Both are phenomena of limited empirical 
occurrence (see Verbeke and Yuan 2006) yet of high conceptual interest. Born-global 
firms need more than already established firms to simultaneously consider O and L 
(and perhaps also I), while meta-nationals can be seen as global Penrosean 
resource/knowledge seekers/optimizers. 
 
In terms of the three questions posed earlier in this paper, Penrose and the 
resource/knowledge-based approach explain ‘why internationalization’ in terms of 
firms ‘productive opportunity’, ‘why internalization’ in terms of ‘superior relative 
intra-firm ability for resource-knowledge transfer as well as resource/knowledge 
acquisition’, and ‘which country’ in terms of ‘perceived relative [dis]advantages of 
countries as seen from the perspective of firms’ productive opportunity’, and for 
exploitation and acquisition of resource/knowledge (and institutional) advantages (see 
Dunning, 2005, for the latter). These are in line with, and extend, extant theory and 
the OLI. 
 
Two major propositions follow.  
Proposition 1: In considering FDI, MNEs attempt to simultaneously optimize the O, 
L and I advantages. 
Proposition 2: Managers may consciously take what they perceive to be suboptimal 
decisions today when/if they expect these decisions to prove superior under perceived 
future conditions. 
 
Both propositions seem to be well in line with current practice of MNEs. For 
example, by recently undertaking FDI in the UK, through acquisition of the RMC 
Group, the Mexican MNE, Cemex, chooses a location that confers to it an ownership 
and an internalization advantage simultaneously.  
 
As The Economist observes, “The acquisition of the RMC added new expertise in 
ready-mix which was important, and more large-scale construction projects were 
beginning to be undertaken in Mexico, and Cemex’s international competitors began 
to muscle in on the company’s domestic market.” (The Economist, 2005, p. 88). 
 
What this quote also shows is that Cemex’s choice is not necessarily the optimal one 
in terms of a pure net present value calculus of today’s conditions. Instead, it is based 
on expectations of change both with regard to impending changes in the sector in 
Mexico and emerging competition. Clearly, once Cemex has taken its decision it will 
also have to make the best of it by trying to influence the very changes it expects will 
take place, in the direction of the decision it has already taken. All this is very 
consistent with, and follows naturally from, the learning perspective. In contrast, 
Cemex’ approach is more difficult to explain in terms of transaction costs, 
power/efficiency, and resource-based reasoning alone, and therefore in terms of the 
constituent element of the OLI. Clearly Cemex is only an example and much more 
research and evidence is required to substantiate our claims. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL PRACTICE 
 
Penrose’s insights provide the basis for a resource/knowledge-based OLI, which 
1. helps explain the derivations of O, L and I advantages endogenously 
2. pays more attention to firms’ efforts to shape/create the O, L and I 
advantages (and (through) their ‘productive opportunity’) 
3. helps explain whether, what, when and how to internalize (thus create) I 
(and L) advantages 
4. emphasizes the interaction between O, L and I 
5. emphasizes the forward looking nature of decisions on O, L and I 
 
All these help develop a more endogenous dynamic, strategic, and  forward looking 
theory of the MNE. They provide added explanation and support for Dunning’s 
choice of O (not M) and more recent additions to I and L, such as asset and 
institution-seeking FDI. 
 
Concerning ‘managerial practice’ the resource/knowledge-based OLI, is messier, less 
positivist. It points to the following prescription for practice. Use extant dispersed 
knowledge, while developing new. Use available knowledge and information in order 
to make (imperfect) decisions on O, L and I, taking into account your perceived 
current conditions, but also your perception of where things are heading. Try to shape 
both the internal and external environments to suit your choices, recognize that 
mistakes are likely, try to correct these or change track, when correcting is too 
expensive. In all cases learn from your mistakes (as well as your successes). 
Importantly, learn to unlearn. Current success could be a recipe for future disasters, 
current failures, an incentive to future success. (Business) life is messy, but all the 
more exciting for it. 
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